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Brazil’s presidential system is characterized by the existence of many political parties that are
elected for the Chamber of Deputies and unite in legislative coalitions to form a majority. Since
the re-democratization in 1985, Brazil has had 8 direct presidential elections, among which there
were two impeachments of the elected president. In this work we characterize the stability of the
presidential regime and the periods of rupture analysing the votes that took place in the Chamber
of Deputies from 1991 to 2019. We start by measuring the cohesion of the parties and the congress
in the votes, quantifying the agreement between the votes of congressmen and observe that there
is a stronger polarization among congressmen during legislative periods where there was no im-
peachment, referred to here as stable legislative periods. Using clustering algorithms, we are able to
associate these polarized groups observed during the stable periods with the opposition to the gov-
ernment and government base. To characterize the impeachment of Dilma Roussef that happened
in 2016 we analyze how the agreement between congressmen and the government evolved over time
and identified, using cluster algorithms, that all the parties belonging to the majority coalition of
the president, except her own party and another one, migrated to the opposition just before the
impeachment. Our analyses allow us to identify some differences between stable presidential periods
and Legislative terms with an impeachment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern day technologies allow for the easy gather,
storage and distribution of data relevant in many fields,
such as political sciences, which have been traditionally
tackled mainly by qualitative approaches. Quantitative
analysis of these data should give insights in the workings
of the many democratic institutions that run most of the
countries in the world. The idea behind western-style
representative democracy [1] is that, through elections,
the people choose those that better represent their inter-
ests for these many democratic institutions and that the
plurality of these institutions guarantees the checks and
balances needed to prevent abuses and self interests from
prevailing. Moreover, representatives with common goals
and ideals gather together to form political parties which,
in principle, ease the identification of the electorate’s in-
terests within these groups of representatives.
One of such institutions is the chamber of represen-
tatives or national congress, where laws are analysed
and voted by the congressmen (elected representatives
of the people). Several works analyse data from elections
[2, 3], its financing and how inappropriate money gather-
ing might threaten the idea that the elected candidates do
represent the people’s interests [4–6]. Also the dynamics
in the legislative chambers is analysed in different con-
texts. Such works might take into account the contents of
the issues discussed and voted by the congressmen [7–9].
Ideal point models are based on our intuition that con-
gressmen have positions in an abstract ideological space
and cast their votes in roll calls based on where the voted
bills lie in this space [10, 11]. Such approaches, though,
require an assessment not only of the voting data, but
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also of the contents of bills and speeches, which is invari-
ably biased by the readers interpretations and therefore
not indisputably objective. Other approaches study only
the similarities between the votes cast by the politicians
[12, 13].
In the present work, we follow this former approach
and analyse the voting patterns in the Brazilian Cham-
ber of Deputies (the lower chamber of Brazil’s bicameral
legislative power, composed by this chamber and the sen-
ate). Our approach is blind to the contents of the bills
voted in the congress. It analyses the cohesion of the
votes results for each bill and the similarities in the votes
sequences of each pair of congressmen using the k-means
clustering algorithm. The objective of this clustering
analysis is to identify the de facto groups of congress-
men that vote cohesively in the roll calls and some of the
dynamics behind these groups. We note that there are
more than 30 political parties represented in the Brazil-
ian congress [14] and the president’s party alone does not
have majority in the legislative. Therefore, in order to
have a stable government, the president resorts to what
has come to be called “coalitional presidentialism” [15–
18]. This concept is defined as a strategy of directly
elected minority presidents to build durable, cross-party
support in a multiparty presidential regime. The nomi-
nal 30 different political parties end up split into fewer
actually interacting groups [19] in the legislature. We
also investigate how changes in this split might lead to
an unstable government resulting in the impeachment of
the president.
The data analysed, the methods and metrics used in
the study are explained in the next section. In section
III we present the results highlighting the differences be-
tween stable regimes and those where an impeachment
happened. Finally we present a discussion, summary and
our conclusions.
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2II. DATA AND METHODS
A. Legislative periods analyzed in this work
Table I presents information about the eight legisla-
tive terms analyzed in this work. It shows the number
of the legislative period, the abbreviation of the name
of the presidents and how we will refer to them along
the paper, the start and end date of the term of each
president, the total number of congressmen Nd and the
total number of roll calls Nrc in the period. The names
of the presidents are Fernando Collor de Mello (identified
as Collor), who resigned as president in 1992 to prevent
an impeachment. He was followed by Itamar Franco (Ita-
mar), then Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who had
two consecutives mandates (that we refer to as FHC I and
FHC II). Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) also had two
mandates, followed by Dilma Rousseff (Dilma) who com-
pleted her first mandate (Dilma I) and was ellected for
the second term (Dilma II) but was removed from office
through an impeachment process in 2016 and replaced by
Michael Temer (Temer). In 2019 Jair Messias Bolsonaro
(Bolsonaro) became president of Brazil. A normal leg-
islative term in Brazil lasts for 4 years but in the case
of Bolsonaro we will show the data of the first year of
mandate (until Dec/2019). The table also indicates the
total number of parties Npar elected to the Chamber of
Deputies [20] and an effective number of parties N effpar [21],
which takes into account the number of congressmen per
party and gives a better idea of the fragmentation of the
congress. This effective number of parties is defined as:
N effpar = 1/
∑
i
p2i , where pi is the proportion of seats the
ith party has. The N effpar is equal to the actual number of
parties if every party has the same size and is closer to
one if most congressmen belong to only one party. These
numbers are calculated with the parties assignments in
the moment of the elections results.
We close this section with a remark about the ending
dates shown in Table I. In the legislative terms where
there was an impeachment (Collor-Itamar and Dilma-
Temer), the ending date corresponds to the moment at
which the president was removed form her/his position.
According to Brazilian law, the president is removed
from office once the impeachment process is started and
the official judgment of the impeachment happens three
months latter by the Senate, when she/he might be
brought back if declared not guilty or be officially re-
moved otherwise.
B. Data format
Brazil has excellent transparency laws which have been
very well implemented and nowadays it is fairly easy to
access huge amounts of data concerning the public ad-
ministration and the legislative [22]. In this work, we use
data available from the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies,
TABLE I. A summary of the Legislative periods analyzed in
this work. The columns show respectively: the Legislature
number, the abbreviation of the name of the president, the
starting and ending date of the term, number of congressmen
Nd and number of roll calls Nrc voted during the respective
legislative period.
Legis. Presidential Start date End date Nd Nrc Npar N effparTerm
49 Collor 01/02/1991 28/09/1992 507 73 19 9.1
Itamar 29/09/1992 31/01/1995 506 85
50 FHC I 01/02/1995 31/01/1999 590 468 18 8.1
51 FHC II 01/02/1999 31/01/2003 583 419 17 7.1
51 Lula I 01/02/2003 31/01/2007 566 450 18 8.4
53 Lula II 01/02/2007 31/01/2011 559 611 20 9.3
54 Dilma I 01/02/2011 31/01/2015 583 430 22 10.4
55 Dilma II 01/02/2015 11/05/2016 553 330 28 13.4
Temer 12/05/2016 31/01/2019 570 525
56 Bolsonaro 01/02/2019 31/12/2019 548 329 30 16.4
concerning roll calls in the national congress [23, 24].
From the application programming interface (API) de-
veloped by the I.T. personal working in the congress, one
can obtain a list of roll calls voted in a given year and
the votes cast by the congressman in each open roll call.
In Table II we show schematically the type of data we
obtain from this database. Each roll call is represented
in Table II by rq, where q = 1, ..,Nrc where Nrc is the
total number of roll calls voted during a given legislative
period. The congressmen are represented by di, where
i = 1, .., Nd where Nd is the total number of congress-
men. For each congressman di one has a sequence of
votes which can be represented by a vector of options
oi = (o
1
i , o
2
i , . . . , o
Nrc
i ) where each o
q
i = vj can assume
5 different values: v1 =Yes, v2 =No, v3 =Abstention,
v4 =Obstruction and v5 =Art.171 (a given congressman
may also be absent from a given roll call, an issue which
will be discussed latter).
For each congressman, there is the information about
his party affiliation and the federal unity she/he repre-
sents. Some roll calls also contain information about how
the government, coalitions and the parties oriented their
congressmen to vote.
It is important to point out some characteristics of
these data to understand the limitations of our study.
The roll calls whose votes are registered in the database
[23, 25] are called “nominal” or open. These are the ones
we evaluate and they represent less than 20% of the total
vote sessions in the congress; more than 80% of the votes
in the plenary are secret and only the results are made
1 This last option is reserved for a small fraction of congressmen
that compose the presiding table at the plenary.
3TABLE II. Schema of structure of the data. Each roll call
is represented by rk and congressmen are represented by di.
For each deputy, we know a list of he/her votes in each roll
call: oi = (o1i , o2i , . . . , o
Nrc
i ) and oi may have 6 different op-
tions, as explained in the text. For each deputy there are also
other information as for example the party pi to which he/she
belongs.
deputy r1 r2 ... rNp party
d1 o
1
1 o
2
1 ... o
Np
1 p1
d2 o
1
2 o
2
2 ... o
Np
2 p2
...
...
...
. . .
... . . .
dNd o
1
Nd
o2Nd ... o
Np
Nd
pNd
public2. Moreover most of the bills are never put to vote
and this is related to the fact that mostly, it is the Presi-
dent of the Chamber of Deputies who decides which bills
are voted and in which order. This choice is clearly not
random, but is subject to political calculation. This in-
troduces a bias in our analysis that is a common feature
of many roll call analysis studies [26].
We end this section with three considerations about
our choice of analyses. In this work we consider all roll
calls of the database as equally important, without giv-
ing weight to different types of projects or the subject
tackled in the bills and roll calls. Considering the num-
ber of congressmen, there are 513 congressmen elected
for each legislative term. Some of them are nominated
as ministers or any other functions and are replaced by
an alternate congressman. Then, in practice, there are
much more than 513 congressmen who vote along the
four years of mandate. Some congressmen participate in
very few roll calls and we exclude them from our analysis
with a criterion that is explained in the Appendix A. This
question of congressmen migration and participation in
the roll calls is studied in detail in [27]. Also, congress-
men can change parties during a legislative period. In
this work we assume that a deputy belongs to the party
for which he voted differently from “Absent” for the first
time.
C. Measurements
In this subsection we define the quantities used in this
work to analyse the legislative data.
2 From all roll calls voted per year that one can download from
[24], only in around 20% of the cases one is able to obtain the
list of votes by congressman. The real number of secret and open
roll calls might be different since the database itself claims not
to be completely up to date.
1. Cohesion in the roll calls
As mentioned above, there are 5 different ways a con-
gressman may vote besides being absent in a roll call.
These different alternatives do point to different strate-
gies the government, opposition and the different parties
may be adopting given the bill at hand. There are of
course the yes and no alternatives indicating support to
approve or dismiss a given bill, but other alternatives like
obstruction or abstention may indicate a push to either
postpone or alter the bill.
In order to evaluate the cohesion of a given party in
a roll call, and therefore to assess whether the party is
cohesively following a given strategy, we adopt a con-
cept from information theory: the Shannon entropy [28],
which measures the uncertainty in a distribution. Given
that a fraction pi of the congressman from a given party
voted option vi in a given roll call, one can evaluate
S = −
nv∑
i=1
pi ln pi (1)
C = 1− S
lnnv
, (2)
where S is the Shannon entropy for the distribution of
pi’s, which assumes values between 0, when all congress-
men in the party voted the same option (zero uncer-
tainty), and lnnv when the congressmen voted evenly
among the nv different options voted (maximum uncer-
tainty). Note that the value of C, which we will be calling
cohesion, will be between 1 (cohesive strategy adopted)
and 0 (party most divided).
Given a roll call, one can evaluate two global cohesions
associated to it, which are going to be called effective
cohesion CEff and party cohesion CParty. The effective
cohesion is evaluated using the pi distribution in a given
roll call without regard to the parties, just evaluating
the total number of congressmen that voted each option.
For evaluating the party cohesion, given a roll call, first
for each party the particular party cohesion is evaluated,
and the total roll call party cohesion is then the weighted
average of the parties cohesions:
CParty =
1
N
∑
j
Cini, (3)
where N is the total number of congressmen not absent
from the roll call vote, the sum runs over all parties that
participated in the roll call, Ci is the cohesion of party i
in the roll call and ni is the number of congressmen from
party i that participated in roll call.
2. Agreement between congressmen
To quantify how similar are the sequences of votes be-
tween two congressmen di and dj, we define the agree-
4ment as:
Adi,dj =
1
N
N∑
k
δqdi,dj (4)
where q is the index of the roll call, δqdi,dj is a Kronecker
delta such that, δqdi,dj = 1 if congressmen di and dj vote
with the same option in the roll call q and δqdi,dj = 0 oth-
erwise, N is the total number of roll calls that both con-
gressmen di and dj voted differently than Absent. With
this definition, Adi,dj = 0 if both congressmen voted com-
pletely different or if they are never present simultane-
ously in any roll call and Adi,dj = 1 if they have exactly
the same sequence of votes in all roll calls they both par-
ticipated in a given legislative period.
3. K-means to identify groups in the Chamber of Deputies
In order to identify groups of congressmen who voted
in a similar way, we use the k-means cluster algorithm
[29]. Below we succinctly explain how this method works:
The point is to cluster m observations lying in an N -
dimensional space into k clusters. The algorithm pro-
ceeds as follows:
1. randomly select k observations. These will be
called the centroids of the clusters
2. assign each observation to the cluster whose cen-
troid is closest to it.
3. update the centroids as the mean point of the ob-
servations belonging to the cluster
Repeat the steps 2 and 3 until the the change in the
centroids positions is bellow a given precision. This pro-
cess will cluster the points which are closer together by
minimizing the intra-cluster distance.
In our case, each observations will be the vector
Ai = (Adid1 , Adid2 , . . . , AdidNd )
which characterizes the agreement of the dith congress-
man to all others. The absolute centroid position of each
group is not relevant here, but each congressman has now
a label indicating to which group he/she belongs i.e. to
which other congressmen he is more afine. In Fig. 1 there
is a pictorial representation of the results of the algorithm
for a set of points.
In what follows, we refer to the groups identified by the
this algorithm with a given k as Gkn, where n = 1, 2..., k.
A caveat of this method is that the number of clusters
is an input, not an output of the method. So, for the same
data, one may run the algorithm with different values of
k obtaining different results. A criterion to assess the
best number of cluster is the elbow method which seeks
to identify the value of k for which adding a new cluster
FIG. 1. Example of the k-means algorithm applied to 2-
dimensional data. On the top it is shown the original data.
In the lower left the points are clustered in k = 2 groups,
and identified by color and marker. In the lower right panel
k-means was applied for k = 3.
does not significantly reduces the variance (also called in
this case inertia) for the distribution of the data points
around their assigned centroids [30].
4. Alignment of the clusters with the president’s party
Once we define a group of congressmen Gki using the
k-means algorithm, we can quantify the degree of align-
ment or support of these congressmen with the presi-
dent’s party Pp by defining the following quantity:
Skn =
1
|Gkn||Pp|
∑
dj∈Gk
∑
di∈Pp
Adi,dj , (5)
where |Gkn| and |Pp| are the total number of congressmen
in the group Gkn and in the president’s party Pp, respec-
tively. Note that it is just an average of the agreement
over pairs of congressmen, one belonging to a cluster Gkn
and the other to the presidents party Pp. This quantity
is expected to be closer to 1 if the group Gkn has parties
aligned politically with the government and is expected
to be smaller if Gkn has congressmen who belong to the
opposition to the government.
The Skn can be defined in different intervals of time in
a given legislative term in order to study its change and
behaviour along the time. The dynamics of this measure
over time is a way to identify possible instabilities of a
presidential term.
5III. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITY DATA
In this section we present the results of the analyses us-
ing the data for the roll calls in the Chamber of Deputies.
A. The roll calls in cohesion space
As explained in section IIC 1, one can associate to each
roll call two measures of cohesion, the effective cohesion
CEff and the party cohesion CParty. These cohesion pa-
rameters define, therefore, a two dimensional phase-space
where one can locate each roll call.
In Fig.2 it is shown the scatter plots of the roll calls
for the different legislative terms in this cohesion phase
space. In these plots, each roll call is a point in the
CEff × CParty space. Points on the diagonal line indicate
that the cohesion inside a party is the same as the co-
hesion on the whole National Congress for a given roll
call. Points below the diagonal indicate the roll calls
that have higher cohesion inside of the parties than in
the whole congress. From the figure it is possible to ob-
serve first that the same pattern repeats in all legisla-
tive periods: roughly, two groups of votes tend to form
a more compact cluster, one with high cohesion and a
more disperse one with sometimes high and sometimes
low cohesion. Moreover, in either cluster of points, effec-
tive and party cohesion seem to be correlated, one tends
to be high when the other is high as well. We should note
here, that this correlation is not evident from the defini-
tions of these parameters. One is measuring the parties
intrinsic cohesion and the other the overall result of a roll
call. Were the congress evenly divided into two strongly
opposed parties, a high party cohesion would imply a
low effective cohesion for one party would systematically
vote the opposite option than the other, meaning that
the party cohesion would be high, but the effective cohe-
sion low because the overall result of the vote would be
divided. Therefore, it is interesting to observe here that
very polarizing issues in the congress tend not only to
unite intrinsically the parties, but also the parties among
them and dividing issues, tend not necessarily to oppose
parties against each other, but rather to divide the par-
ties intrinsically.
Overall, these data suggest that there are two types of
roll calls in terms of cohesion as we explain now. Some
roll calls form a cluster on the top right in the scatter
plots and lay on the diagonal line. These are roll calls for
which there is a very high cohesion inside of the parties
and in the congress itself. These roll calls correspond to
subjects that are consensual and therefore are not use-
ful to distinguish different ideologies among parties. On
the other hand, more diffuse points represent roll calls
for which there are less cohesion. Because these points
appear for smaller values of C, they indicate that, both
deputies inside a party or of the whole congress vote in a
less cohesive way. These can be seen as more controver-
sial roll calls both among congressmen of a given party
and among all the congressman of the National Congress.
FIG. 2. Roll calls in cohesion phase space. The plots in the
two columns show each legislative period separately and the
last one below has all roll calls for all periods superposed. In
this last plot, also the main diagonal line is traced in light
grey color.
6B. Distribution of the agreement between
congressmen
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of Adi,dj , as defined in
section IIC 2, for the eight legislative terms considered
in this work. By inspecting the distributions we iden-
tify that most of the terms presents a bimodal distribu-
tion, the exception being the periods governed by Collor-
Itamar, Dilma I and Dilma-Temer. A similar pattern
was observed using a different type of measure of agree-
ment [13], where the authors fit a bimodal function to
the distributions and they find and associate the relative
distance between the peaks to an indicative of instability.
The periods Collor-Itamar and Dilma-Temer are re-
ferred to as politically unstable because in both there
was an impeachment of the president3. When Dilma-
Temer term is separated in two parts, one before and
the other after the impeachment, into a Dilma II period
and a Temer period (as shown in Fig. 4), it is observed
that the agreements in the Dilma II period are unimodal
while in Temer’s are bimodal, very similar to FHC, Lula
or Bolsonaro. The same process shows that both Collor
and Itamar are separately unimodal.
This observed bimodality during stable legislative peri-
ods suggests that a polarization into two opposing blocks
seems necessary to stabilize the Brazilian political sys-
tem. This is a curious result because Brazil has one of
most fragmented political system in the world, having
many political parties, as shown in Table I. To better
characterize these periods of stability and instabilities,
in the next sections we cluster congressmen in groups
and analyse their behavior along the time.
C. Discriminating groups in the Chamber of
Deputies
In principle, a direct way to analyse the dynamics of
groups in the congress is by diving congressmen in their
own political parties. For each party it is possible to
quantify, for example, how aligned they are with the gov-
ernment and how faithful congressmen are to their own
parties. These quantities can be evaluated for different
roll calls and give us a notion of how groups behave over
time. In spite of being a natural choice of groups, this ap-
proach might be problematic for some reasons. First be-
cause there are many parties in the Chamber of Deputies,
as shown in Table I, and they have different sizes and
influence in the political scenario. Second, because par-
ties break up and congressmen change parties along the
same legislative periods [27]. As a result, the fluctuation
in these data are so important that one cannot extract a
clear picture of the difference between stable and unsta-
ble regimes. Here also one might resort to the conclusions
3 Officially, Collor resigned before being impeached to avoid loos-
ing his political rights (a move similar as done by Nixon).
FIG. 3. Normalized distribution of the agreement matrix el-
ements for each analyzed period.
drawn from Fig. 2 and realize that those issues dividing
the congress are, as well those that divide the most the
parties. To avoid these problems, in the following we use
the sequence of agreements between the votes of the con-
gressmen as entries in the k-means clustering algorithm
to analyse how congressmen effectively aggregate. It al-
lows us to identify some important groups in the congress
and how they evolve in time.
1. Identifying an effective ruling coalition and opposition
for each presidential term
We use the k-mean algorithm to divide the congress-
men in groups. As explained in section IIC 3, this type
of algorithm requires a pre-definition of the number k of
groups into which one wants to partition a given sequence
of observations. For each presidential term, we consider
k = 2 and divide allNd congressmen in two groups, called
G21 and G22. For each of these groups, we quantify their
support to the president’s party by using the quantity Skn
defined in the section IIC 4. Table III shows the number
of congressmen identified in each group, the proportion
of these groups in terms of the total number of congress-
men Nd and how each group aligns with the president’s
party.
7TABLE III. Absolute size of the clusters G2i in terms of num-
ber of deputies (relative sizes G2i /Nd) and their support S2i
to the president party in the correspondent period.
President G21 G22 S21 S22
Collor 356 (70%) 151 (30%) 0.84 0.4
Itamar 400 (79%) 106 (21%) 0.77 0.61
FHC I 440 (77%) 133 (23%) 0.81 0.33
FHC II 402 (71%) 161 (29%) 0.89 0.5
Lula I 412 (76%) 133 (24%) 0.85 0.41
Lula II 403 (75%) 133 (25%) 0.89 0.34
Dilma I 438 (79%) 115 (21%) 0.8 0.45
Dilma II 326 (63%) 195 (37%) 0.72 0.4
Temer 417 (78%) 120 (22%) 0.86 0.29
Bolsonaro 384 (74%) 133 (26%) 0.86 0.29
We observe in that the group G21 corresponds at least
to 70% of the total number of congressmen in all terms,
except in the case of Dilma II. Moreover, the support
quantity of this group S21 is around 0.8 in all terms, which
indicates that this group is aligned with the president’s
party. This suggests that this majority group can be as-
sociated to an ruling coalition with the president. The
minority group G22 has alignment with the president’s
party S22 much smaller than S21 . We associate this minor-
ity group with an effective opposition to the government.
To check how much these effective ruling coalition G21
and effective opposition G22 coincide with an officially de-
clared base and opposition to the government, we identi-
fied the legislative terms for which the election occurred
in two rounds. When this is the case, in the second round,
many parties organize in a coalition, declaring publicly
support to one or the other candidate. The parties which
belong to the coalition that won the election we iden-
tify as self-declared ruling coalition Bsd, while parties in
the coalition that lost the election are identified as self-
declared opposition, Osd. Some parties do not declare
any position before the election and were identified as
non-declared. Tables IV and V show, for two legislative
terms, the fraction of congressmen that belong to a party
of the Bsd that is identified as well as either an effective
basis (G21/Bsd) or effective opposition, (G22/Bsd), and the
same for the self declared opposition (G2i /Osd) and non-
declared position. Observing the diagonal of these tables
one can see that G21 corresponds to 98.7% for Lula II and
89% for Dilma II of the self-declared basis Bsd. G22 coin-
cides with 84.7% in the case of Lula II and with 75% for
Dilma II of the self-declared opposition. These high val-
ues occur for all the legislative terms for which we could
do this analyses and they justify our interpretation of the
groups encountered by the k-means algorithm as ruling
coalition and opposition.
TABLE IV. Lula II - Crosstabulation of identified clusters G2i
and self declared party affiliation at the second round of the
election. Footnotes in these tables specify the parties that
publicly declared support for one candidate or the other.
G21 G
2
2 Total
Bsd a 232 (98.7%) 3 (1.3%) 235
Osd b 22 (15.3%) 122 (84.7%) 144
Non Declared c 149 (94.9%) 8 (5.1%) 157
Total 403 (75.2%) 133 (24.8%) 536
a PCdoB, PP, PR, PRB, PSB, PT, PTB,
b DEM (PFL), PPS, PSDB
c PAN, PHS, PMN, PSOL, PTC, PTdoB, PV, PDT, PMDB,
PSC
TABLE V. Dilma II - Crosstabulation of identified clusters
G2i and self declared party affiliation at the second round of
the election. Footnotes in these tables specify the parties that
publicly declared support for one candidate or the other.
G21 G
2
2 Total
Bsd a 275 (89.3%) 33 (10.7%) 308
Osd b 51 (24.5%) 157 (75.5%) 208
Non Declared c 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 5
Total 326 (62.6%) 195 (37.4%) 521
a PT, PMDB, PSD, PP, PR, PROS, PDT, PCdoB, PRB
b PSDB, PMN, SD, DEM, PEN, PTN, PTB, PTC, PTdoB,
PSB, PV, PSC, PPS, PSDC, PHS, PSL, PRP, PRTB
c PSOL
2. Interpretation of the agreement between congressmen
In this subsection we use the separation in two groups
discussed in the previous subsection to interpret the
peaks in the distribution of agreements and how good
this separation is to identify different behaviors in the
Congress. Fig.4 shows the data for two different legisla-
tive periods: Lula II that is typical of a stable period and
the Dilma II and Temer, the two parts of a term where
there was an impeachment.
The first line of Fig.4-a shows ρ(Adi,dj) for the Leg-
islative period correspondent to Lula II, which has been
already presented in Fig.3 and is repeated here to be
easily comparable with the Dilma II and Temer periods,
shown in the second and third lines of Fig.4-a, respec-
tively. We remind that Dilma II is defined as the pe-
riod before the beginning of impeachment process in the
Legislative period called Dilma-Temer. The exact dates
used to separate the two periods are shown in Table I.
Fig.4-b show the matrix of entries Adi,dj as a function of
the indexes of the deputy di and dj. We then measure
the degree centrality of the dith congressman, defined as
Ddi =
∑
dj
Adi,dj and introduce a labelm to rank the con-
gressmen in descending order of Dm, D1 > D2 > ...DNd .
This ordered quantity Dm as a function of m is shown in
Fig.4-c (we omit the index m for the sake of cleanness of
the figure). The blue colors shown in this figure repre-
8FIG. 4. For the periods LulaII, Dilma II and Temer, we show (a) the agreement matrix distribution, (b) the agreement matrix
with the agreement according to the color-bar to the right, (c) ranked degrees centrality D of the congressmen colored by
which cluster they were assigned to (blue for G21 and orange for G22), (d) ordered agreement matrix with congressmen ranked
by degree centrality and colored blue if both belong to G21, orange if both belong to G22 and green if one belongs to G21 and the
other to G22, and (e) distribution of agreement matrix separated by the same coloring criterion of (d).
sents the congressmen of the group G21 and orange rep-
resents the congressmen in G22. We use this rank defined
by Dm to reorder the matrix of agreements presented in
Fig.4-d. The colors in this reordered matrix are defined
using the following criterion: if two congressmen di,dj
belong to the same cluster G21, Adi,dj is colored blue; if
both congressmen belong to cluster G22, they are colored
orange; and if each one belongs to a different group, they
are colored green and referred to as “mixed term”. This
same notation of colors is used to represent the distri-
bution of Adi,dj for these tree cases in Fig.4-e. In this
case the distributions are normalized in such a way that
the sum of the areas under the curves of the distribution
is one, observing the proportion between the size of the
groups. Our sorting strategy could be contrasted with
the one adopted in [13] which is to use the Prim algorithm
to determine the minimum spanning tree for their set of
distances (agreements). This strategy considers only the
strongest agreements between congressmen, while ours is
taking into account all information (all agreements).
We can now critically analyse Fig.4 to observe differ-
ences between these legislative terms. The first obser-
vation was already anticipated in section III B: the pe-
riod called Dilma II has a unimodal distribution, while
Temer recovers the two peaks observed in Lula II and
other stable political periods. Without any order, ma-
trices of agreement shown in the Fig.4-b do not allow us
to distinguish any difference between these periods. In
Figs.4-c, we observe that in Lula II and Temer there is
a step in the quantity Dm, and the two levels of the step
correspond to the two groups classified by the clustering
algorithm. On the other hand, in Dilma II there is a
continuous decay of Dm. Ordered matrices represented
in Fig.4-d show a very well defined division in two groups
during the stable political periods as Lula II and Temer,
but in Dilma II, where there was an impeachment, the
division in two groups is not enough to capture the com-
plexity of the groups’ organization in the congress. Fig.4-
e show that during Lula II and Temer, the blue color, that
correspond to the effective ruling coalition, is large, while
the orange group, which was shown to be an effective op-
position, is very small. The green group, which are the
mixed terms, has a much smaller size in the periods Lula
II and Temer, while is the most important distribution in
Dilma II. This mixed group has a peak at smaller values
of Adi,dj and this is just saying that congressmen from two
different groups have smaller agreement in their sequence
of votes, while for the effective ruling coalition and oppo-
sition the average agreement is high inside of each group,
which indicates strong cohesion among them.
The discussion above for the two typical legislative
terms can be extrapolated to the other six terms analyzed
in this work with the same observations. We present a
schema of these characteristics for all legislative terms in
the Fig.6.
To summarize, our analyzes have shown that, during
stable political periods, the government forms an effec-
tive ruling coalition which contains at least 70% of the
congressmen of the congress and this group presents a
strong support to the president’s party. In legislative
terms characterized by an impeachment, the separation
into two effective groups is not enough to discriminate the
9matrix of agreement between congressmen completely. In
the next section we propose to analyse how these two
groups evolve along time in the different legislative terms
and also a further analysis in terms of considering more
than two groups to capture what happens in unstable
periods.
D. Time evolution of the groups in the Chamber of
Deputies
An average measure over the whole legislative terms
might not allow one to understand what happens before
an impeachment or how this is compared to a politically
stable legislative term. To verify how the support to the
government of different groups behaves along time within
a legislative term, we use the following procedure: We
first cluster groups of congressmen using k-means. Once
we have these groups defined, we separate the roll calls in
windows of four months and, for each period, we measure
the support of each group to the president’s party, Skn, as
defined in Eq. (5). The result of this measure in time is
shown in Fig.5 for the same two legislative terms previ-
ously discussed, Lula II and Dilma-Temer. Figures on the
top show the case where the congressmen are segregate
in two effective groups. We emphasize that, for the Lula
II term, groups were defined using the whole presiden-
tial term, while for the term Dilma-Temer, groups were
defined using the period before the impeachment (the
exact dates are shown in Table I). Also note that, that
Figs.5.-b, d show the whole term Dilma-Temer, but what
is represented is the alignment with the Dilma Rousseff’s
party. In these figures, the line width of each group is
proportional to their size and the the notation of colors
is the same as in the previous section: blue denotes effec-
tive ruling coalition, G21, and orange the effective oppo-
sition, G22. Vertical lines in Fig.5-b, d indicates the end
of Dilma Rousseff’s mandate (i.e. the moment Dilma
was removed from government because the impeachment
process begun.).
One can observe that, during the whole period of Lula
II, the effective ruling coalition keeps its support to the
president’s party and that the effective opposition has
a smaller support value that increases at the end of his
mandate. This behavior is observed in other politically
stable legislative terms and is in line with the observation
in a recent work that the polarization decreases as the
end of mandate is approached [13]. In the Dilma-Temer
period, the situation is very different: i) the support and
the size of the effective ruling coalition is smaller than
in the Lula II period and ii) the group associated to an
effective ruling coalition in the Dilma’s government de-
creases its support S21 to a value comparable to the one
of the effective opposition S22 after the impeachment.
To better understand this behavior we repeat the pre-
vious analysis, but this time using k-means with k = 3
to separate the congressmen in clusters G31, G32 and G33.
For each of these groups, we measure their support to the
FIG. 5. Evolution of clusters support to the president’s party.
The clusters were found with k-means and using the whole
Lula II period and from the beginning of Dilma II period up
to the beginning of her impeachment process, indicated by
the vertical line. The width of the line is proportional to the
cluster size. The legend indicates the group name.
president’s party as a function of time and show the re-
sults in Figs.5-c,d. In these figures, red is the third group
identified in this process. As previously, the line width is
proportional to the group sizes. In the period Lula II, we
observe that the third group is very small and basically
is aligned to the president’s party as the effective rul-
ing coalition. However, in Dilma II, the third group G33
is significantly bigger than the effective ruling coalition
G31. Moreover, its support to Dilma Rousseff’s measured
by S33 clearly decays and joins the effective opposition
G32. The effective ruling coalition, shown in blue G31, is
really small but keeps aligned during the four years pe-
riod. We emphasize again that Figs.5-b,d show the whole
Dilma-Temer term, though the division in groups is made
before the impeachment and the alignment is calculated
with the Dilma Rousseff’s party (PT).
Table VI summarizes the size of each group Gkn and
its alignment to the president’s party Skn for the eight
presidential terms. We note that both the group size and
its alignment needs to be relatively high to guarantee the
president stability. One can see that Dilma I and Dilma II
periods stand out by the small size of G31 and large size of
G33 (though G32 is also large in Dilma II). In this table we
don’t yet observe a small value of S33 for Dilma II period
because the support of the G33 only decays significantly
very close to the impeachment process, as shown in Fig. 5.
Even though Bolsonaro’s S33 is the only one below 0.6, the
size of G33 is of only 9% of the congress which makes it
not really significant.
We analysed carefully the composition of the G groups
in order to understand which parties form the group
called G33 and we identify the following: i) in Lula II,
this group corresponds only to 7% of the total number
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TABLE VI. Absolute sizes of clusters G3i (their proportion)
and their support S2i to the president party in the correspon-
dent period.
President G31 G32 G33 S31 S32 S33
Collor 250(49%) 118(23%) 139(27%) 0.68 0.36 0.89
Itamar 312(62%) 100(20%) 94(19%) 0.8 0.61 0.66
FHC I 354(62%) 117(20%) 102(18%) 0.84 0.3 0.67
FHC II 387(69%) 134(24%) 42(7%) 0.9 0.47 0.67
Lula I 320(59%) 121(22%) 104(19%) 0.88 0.39 0.72
Lula II 376(70%) 122(23%) 38(7%) 0.9 0.32 0.69
Dilma I 138(25%) 115(21%) 300(54%) 0.89 0.45 0.76
Dilma II 82(16%) 191(37%) 248(48%) 0.88 0.4 0.67
Temer 363(68%) 107(20%) 67(12%) 0.88 0.27 0.66
Bolsonaro 370(72%) 101(20%) 45(9%) 0.87 0.23 0.54
of congressmen and ii) it is composed by congressmen
of both groups G21 and G22. In other words, this small
group G33 is composed by congressmen from the effective
opposition and effective ruling coalition. On the other
hand, in the case of Dilma II, what happens is that there
is a migration from the effective basis G21 to this group
G33; the only parties that keep with the president are her
own party and another one. Moreover, this new group is
now composed by 48% of the congressmen. If one adds
this 45% of congressmen to the previous 37% of congress-
men identified in G22 (which is the same as G32), Dilma
Rousseff had an effective opposition of almost the whole
congress at the moment of her impeachment. The details
about the migration of deputies between groups discrim-
inated by parties are shown in Tables VII and VIII of the
Appendix B for two legislative terms.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Using data from all nominal roll calls occurred in the
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2019, after
locating the roll calls in a cohesion phase space, we com-
puted how similar is the sequence of votes between two
congressmen di and dj and refer to it as “agreement be-
tween congressmen”, Adi,dj . Using this quantity as input
data of the clustering algorithm k-means, we separate
the congressmen in k groups identified as Gkn. For each
of these groups, we defined Skn that quantifies how strong
is each group’s support to the president’s party. We then
measure how this quantity evolves in time for each leg-
islative term.
From the assessment of the cohesion of the vote results
in the roll calls, we observe that effective and party cohe-
sion’s seem to be correlated. This means that issues that
unite the congressman from a same party are those that
also unite the parties around the same cause and issues
that divide the congressman are not pitching only parties
with opposing ideas against each other, but also causing
some kind of dissension within the parties themselves.
This observation calls into question whether parties are
an effective means for the electorate to associate its in-
terests in a cohesive group of representatives. One does
observe from the data, though, some kind of coherent be-
haviour in the congress in respect to the mater of forming
a ruling coalition.
Since 1991, Brazil has had eight direct presidential
elections and in two of them there was an impeachment of
the elected presidents. The periods without an impeach-
ment are referred to as stable political terms in contrast
with the terms with an impeachment, referred to as un-
stable. Our analyses show some differences between these
two types of periods, as we now summarize and discuss
with the help of the schema presented in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 is divided by lines and rows. In lines we show
the legilastive terms almost in cronological order. The
exception is Temer, who governed after Dilma but we
aggregate him with other presidents with political stabil-
ity. Bolsonaro is not represented in this figure because
his government is only at its second year. We will com-
ment about him later based on what we can observe now.
In rows we show different types of measures presented in
this work.
Stable political periods can be characterized as follows.
The distribution of Adi,dj presents two peaks, while a con-
tinuous, unimodal distribution is observed in legislative
periods that have had an impeachment. The exception is
Dilma I, where we observe a unimodality in this distribu-
tion. Although she was not impeached in this period, it
might mean that the instability that lead to her impeach-
ment in the second term had already began in her first
term. When congressmen are divided in k = 2 groups
called G21 and G22, it is observed that i) G21 is composed
by at least 70% of the congressmen, ii) it presents a high
support for the president’s party and iii) this support is
high along the whole legislative term. The biggest group
with a high support to the president’s party is associated
with an effective ruling coalition, which correlates well
with a self-declared coalition in cases where this compar-
ison is possible. All this suggests that the stability of the
presidents requires a big and cohesive effective coalition
during the whole mandate. Our data show that “big”
means at least 70% of the congressmen, although we do
not have a theory to assume that this is a minimum value.
Moreover, we analysed the stability of this division in
two groups by dividing them in k = 3. We observe that,
for stable legislative terms, the third group is very small
(from 7% to 20% of the congressmen), it is composed
by congressmen from the two other groups G21 and G22
and presents a high value of support to the president’s
party during the whole legislative term. In these cases,
the third group is effectively part of a coalition with the
government.
Dilma’s impeachment in her second term is character-
ized by the decay of the S21 along the legislative term.
When the congress is separated into 3 groups, one clearly
observes that this coalition represented by the group G21
which is composed by 63% of congressmen splits into
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FIG. 6. Scheme of some characteristics of different legislative terms. The first column shows the distribution of agreements
between votes of congressmen, indicating that for all stable periods the distribution is bimodal while for legislative terms with
an impeachment and Dilma I (pre-impeachment) the behavior is unimodal. We then show the group sizes (represented by
different colors in the donuts) and how the alignment to the president’s party Skn behaves along the legislative term for the case
where congressman are divided in k = 2 and k = 3 groups using the k-means algorithm. The color code here is the same as for
previous figures: blue for effective ruling coalition and orange for effective opposition and red for the third group. For k = 2
we observe that the G22 group is only bigger than 30% in Dilma II. The support to president’s party Skn shows tree possible
behavior: for all legislative terms except Dilma II, groups keep their support along time or the opposition group aligns more
to the president’s party close to the election. For DilmaII case, we observe that the ruling coalition support decays and reach
the same support as the opposition. For k = 3, besides showing the groups size, black arrows also indicate how congressman
migrate to compose the group G33: for most legislative periods, G33 is composed by congressman from two groups but for DilmaI
and DilmaII, they completely migrate from the G21, resulting in a very small effective ruling coalition. In the last column, it is
shown how Skn as a function of time.
two groups: a very small group G31 with around 16%
of the congressmen that keeps its support and the other
part that aligns with the opposition and the group G33
with 37% of the congressman. These 16% of congress-
men corresponds to her own party and another one; all
other parties, including PMDB which was the party of
the vice-president migrate to an opposition. Collor was
also impeached and does not present a decay of S21 but
the division by tree groups also shows that his real coali-
tion was smaller than 50% of the congress, which sug-
gests that the division into two effective groups with a
supportive and cohesive coalition was not stable.
V. CONCLUSION
Thirty years ago the concept of coalisional presidential-
ism was proposed [15] to understand presidential regimes
with many parties. The idea is simple: if a president
cannot form a majority in the Parliament with his/her
own party, a coalition between many parties is necessary.
Moreover, it was also shown that the projects proposed
by the president’s party have a very high rate of approval
in the Brazilian congress [31]. These results are in line
with our observations during stable periods: Indeed we
observe that stable periods have an important propor-
tion of the congressmen in the ruling coalition with the
president and the support of this group is very high. Our
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data also show that, once this coalition breaks down, the
president’s mandate does not survive. We are not able to
say anything about why this happens but it can perhaps
help to predict if this instability will happen with a given
president. Dilma Rousseff’s first mandate was signaling
this instability as can be seen in some of our quantities
as summarized in Tab. VI. And if these quantities mea-
sured here have any prediction power, based on the first
year of Bolsonaro’s government, we would say that it was
a stable political period. We remind that these analyses
are until December 2019 and that we are right now liv-
ing an important pandemic crisis that may destabilize
the system.
It would be important for next studies to build sta-
tistical models based on some of the characteristics of
the congress that could predict some properties of each
term that could lead to an instability and also to com-
pare with results from roll calls in other countries. For
example, the minimum coalition size and the minimal
support to maintain the mandate. In this respect, we
observe that the measure of cohesion proposed in this
work, Fig. 2, shows that it is possible to classify the
roll calls in two separate groups, one very cohesive that
align all parties together and, therefore, does not seem
to bring relevant information to discriminate groups and
another where the dissension and dynamics pitching the
congressmen with different opposing ideas or strategies is
happening. This observation also call in question the roll
of the exaggerated number of parties in the Brazilian po-
litical scene. The above mentioned measure of cohesion
can be used as a filter of the roll calls that are relevant
to separate parties with real different ideologies. It could
then help building an objective measure of how many
parties would be necessary to represent all the ideologies
present in the Brazilian national Congress.
Appendix A: Criterion of exclusion of congressmen
with low legislative activity
There are congressmen that, for a variety of reasons,
such as becoming ministers or taking another office ap-
pointed by the president or governors, have very few roll
calls where they voted differently than Absent. Those
congressmen usually have some very high (or very low)
agreements with other congressmen with very different
(or very similar) voting records, which introduces noise
in the analysis.
To reduce this source of noise, we analyze the number
of times that each congressman voted in the roll calls in
a given legislative term. The distribution of it is shown
in Fig.7 for all legislative terms together and for one par-
ticular term, showing that there is a regular pattern in
this measure. We observe a peak close to zero that cor-
respond to congressman who rarely vote and a second
peak at higher values in this distribution. We then intro-
duce a cutoff to exclude congressman who voted in less
than 20% of the roll calls. We have played with this cut-
off value and our results are robust against these small
changes. In red are the excluded congressmen, in blue
the kept ones. By choosing a 20% cutoff the largest num-
ber of excluded congressmen happens in the Itamar term
when 15.2% of them were excluded.
As there are substitutes for congressmen that for the
many reasons leave the mandate and we consider each
congressman individually, the total number of congress-
men in our analyses for a given term can be greater than
513, which is the actual number of seats in the congress.
FIG. 7. Distribution of the number of non absent votes for
the congressmen in all periods. In red are the excluded con-
gressmen, in blue the kept ones. Lula I mandate is shown
individually for comparison.
Appendix B: Details about the migration of the
congressmen between groups discriminated by
parties
In Sec. IIID we analyzed the separation of congress-
men in two or three clusters and their support Ski to the
president’s party. In this appendix we detail that analy-
sis.
In Tables VII, VIII we show the crosstabulation of par-
ties and clusters found by k -means for k = 2 and k = 3
with their absolute and relative numbers for Lula II and
Dilma II periods, respectively.
We remark that parties belong mostly to one cluster
only. That is, the boundary between clusters respect the
boundaries between parties.
Also, in Lula II, G33 is small, with only 7% of the con-
gressmen, and the only party that is largely in it is PSOL.
In Dilma II, the only parties that remain in G31 are PT
(Dilma’s own party) and PCdoB, while G32 is essentially
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equal to G22, which means that the government coalition is fractured.
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TABLE VII. Crosstabulation of parties and clusters found by k -means for k = 2 and k = 3 with their absolute and relative
numbers for Lula II period. When there are more than one party name in the same line means that the party changed its
name.
Party G21 G22 G31 G32 G33
DEM/PFL 11 (17%) 55 (83%) 8 (12%) 54 (82%) 4 (6%)
PAN 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PCdoB 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PDT 25 (100%) 0 (0%) 23 (92%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%)
PHS 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PMDB/MDB 89 (97%) 3 (3%) 82 (89%) 1 (1%) 9 (10%)
PMN 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PP/PPB 40 (98%) 1 (2%) 40 (98%) 0 (0%) 1 (2%)
CIDADANIA/PPS 5 (28%) 12 (71%) 4 (24%) 10 (59%) 3 (18%)
PL/PR 36 (100%) 0 (0%) 36 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
REPUBLICANOS/PRB/PMR 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PSB 30 (100%) 0 (0%) 25 (83%) 0 (0%) 5 (17%)
PSC 6 (100%) 0 (0%) 6 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PSDB 6 (10%) 55 (90%) 5 (8%) 55 (90%) 1 (2%)
PSOL 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%)
PT 86 (99%) 1 (1%) 82 (94%) 1 (1%) 4 (5%)
PTB 26 (96%) 1 (4%) 22 (81%) 0 (0%) 5 (19%)
PTC/PRN 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%)
AVANTE/PTdoB 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PV 13 (93%) 1 (7%) 13 (93%) 1 (7%) 0 (0%)
Total 403 (75%) 133 (25%) 376 (70%) 122 (23%) 38 (7%)
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TABLE VIII. Crosstabulation of parties and clusters found by k -means for k = 2 and k = 3 with their absolute and relative
numbers for Dilma II period. We highlight in the table the only two parties that stayed in the group G31, which is the ruling
coalition.
Party G21 G22 G31 G32 G33
DEM/PFL 0 (0%) 22 (100%) 0 (0%) 22 (100%) 0 (0%)
PCdoB 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
PDT 18 (90%) 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 17 (85%)
PATRIOTA/PEN 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%)
PHS 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%)
PMDB/MDB 60 (88%) 8 (12%) 0 (0%) 6 (9%) 62 (91%)
PMN 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 2 (67%)
PP/PPB 26 (65%) 14 (35%) 0 (0%) 14 (35%) 26 (65%)
CIDADANIA/PPS 0 (0%) 11 (100%) 0 (0%) 11 (100%) 0 (0%)
PL/PR 33 (97%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 32 (94%)
REPUBLICANOS/PRB/PMR 20 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 20 (100%)
PROS 12 (86%) 2 (14%) 0 (0%) 2 (14%) 12 (86%)
PRP 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%)
PRTB 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%)
PSB 2 (6%) 31 (94%) 0 (0%) 31 (94%) 2 (6%)
PSC 2 (15%) 11 (85%) 1 (8%) 9 (69%) 3 (23%)
PSD 29 (85%) 5 (15%) 0 (0%) 5 (15%) 29 (85%)
PSDB 0 (0%) 53 (100%) 0 (0%) 53 (100%) 0 (0%)
DC/PSDC 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%)
PSL 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%)
PSOL 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%)
PT 64 (98%) 1 (2%) 64 (98%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%)
PTB 19 (76%) 6 (24%) 0 (0%) 6 (24%) 19 (76%)
PTC/PRN 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%)
PODEMOS/PTN 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%)
AVANTE/PTdoB 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%)
PV 3 (33%) 6 (67%) 1 (11%) 6 (67%) 2 (22%)
SD 1 (6%) 16 (94%) 0 (0%) 16 (94%) 1 (6%)
Total 326 (63%) 195 (37%) 82 (16%) 191 (37%) 248 (48%)
